Public vs. Private Health Care Services Demand in Italy by Fabbri, Daniele & Monfardini, Chiara
PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE HEALTH CARE SERVICES 
DEMAND IN ITALY* 
 
 
 
Daniele Fabbri^ 
Chiara Monfardini^ 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
In this paper we use data coming from the new Italian Survey on Health Ageing and Wealth 
(SHAW) to analyse physician services utilization in Italy explicitly acknowledging the existence of two 
different classes of providers: public and private. We consider visits by a specialist physician as the 
measure of individual services utilization. In particular we assess the relative importance of variables like 
income, education, private insurance and supply characteristics as determinants of the utilization of such 
services, while controlling for individual health and need. We do that by estimating some alternative 
count data regression models of which we discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages and the 
entailed different interpretation of the results.  
 
 
 
 
JEL: C34, C35, C51, D12, I11 
This version: December 2002 
 
 
 
 
^ Daniele Fabbri and Chiara Monfardini are at the Department of Economics - University of Bologna.  
* We are grateful to Agar Brugiavini, Tullio Jappelli, Raffaele Miniaci, Guglielmo Weber and the 
participants to AIEL-2002 and AIES-2002 conferences for helpful comments and discussions. Data used 
in this research are available at: http://www.dise.unisa.it/WP/shaw_public_file.dta. Usual 
disclaimers apply.  
 
Corresponding author: Daniele Fabbri, Department of Economics - University of Bologna, Piazza 
Scaravilli, 2-40126 Bologna, Italy. Telephone: +39-51-2098669, fax: +39-51-2098040, email address: 
dfabbri@economia.unibo.it.  
  
 2
1 INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the underlying process of the demand for health services is a key to a better 
assessment of the forces that increase health care expenditure. Ageing and technological change 
play a major role in this context with cohorts living longer that consume increasing amounts of 
intensive, previously unavailable, treatments. Despite attenuating effects due to the lower 
disability of marginal survivors, health care expenditure is unanimously deemed to increase far 
beyond existing GDP shares [see Cutler - Sheiner (1998)]. In this turmoil public policies are 
repeatedly invoked to cap expenditure spiralling and to deal with related equity issues.  
Looking at OECD data (see Figure 1) it seems that physician services were a victim of this 
course of events. In all other OECD countries, in particular in Italy, total expenditure on 
physician services (including both GPs and specialists) stabilised and then started to decrease as 
a share of total expenditure on health in the last ten years. A possible interpretation of this trend 
relies on the low technological content of such services compared to others like hospital 
treatments, pharmaceuticals and instrumental diagnostic checks. Moreover patient time is a 
basic input in the production of these services. It could be that technological innovation 
positively affected the organisation of these services reducing the number of visits to obtain, for 
example, drugs or checks prescriptions. As a matter of fact capping expenditure in this chapter 
revealed to be relatively easy.  
Figure 1: Total per capita expenditure on physician services as a share of total per 
capita expenditure on health.* 
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* Expenditure (public and private) on physician services includes expenditure on professional health 
services provided by general practitioners and specialists. Includes expenditure on services of osteopaths. 
Original data are denominated in US$/PPP. The OECD average is calculated as a simple mean of the following 
countries rates: Australia, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland. Source: Our elaboration on 
OECD Health Data 2000, OECD, Paris, 2000. 
In order to motivate our interest for the Italian case study it is relevant to notice how did 
that happened in terms of public vs. private involvement. According to OECD data (see Figure 
2) we have no evidence of a shift occurring from public to private expenditure for physician 
services in the USA and other OECD countries. In the USA we actually observe a slight 
decrease in the private share. Italy is a relevant exception.1 The share of private expenditure for 
physician services remained unchanged, at around 30%, from 1980 to 1992, increasing quite 
                                                 
1 Similar trends are to be found in France. 
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rapidly thereafter and reaching more than 44% by 1995. In the meanwhile public per capita 
expenditure (see Figure 3), constantly increasing since 1980 at the same pace as other OECD 
countries, from 1992 stabilised at around 200 US$/PPP. This evidence suggests that a dramatic 
change took place in Italy approximately around 1992. Since then larger shares of expenditure 
for physician services are financed out-of-pocket as a result of two reinforcing dynamics: first, 
access to public providers are increasingly subject to significant co-payments (tickets); second, 
individuals increasingly rely on private professionals. 
Figure 2: Private per capita expenditure on physician services as a share of total per 
capita expenditure on pyhsician services.*  
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* Expenditure on physician services includes expenditure on professional health services provided by general 
practitioners and specialists. Includes expenditure on services of osteopaths. Original data are denominated in 
US$/PPP. The OECD average is calculated as a simple mean of the following countries rates: Australia, France, 
Germany, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland. Source: Our elaboration on OECD Health Data 2000, OECD, 
Paris, 2000. 
Figure 3: Public per capita expenditure on physician services.*  
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In this evolving context some broad policy issues emerge. First of all, how can we figure 
out the future evolution of the demand and expenditure for physician services in Italy? The 
observed and foreseeable reduction of public financing to physician services has some impact in 
terms of equality of access? These kind of questions motivate our interest for a 
microeconometric analysis of the demand for physician services in Italy.  
A remarkable feature of the market for medical professional consultations in Italy is the 
presence of two broad distinguishable classes of providers: public, highly regulated, specialists, 
and private, less regulated, ones. We want to account for this peculiarity in our analysis, an issue 
which has been largely neglected in the literature. Usually the demand for medical consultations 
is modelled as an aggregate demand irrespective of the type of provider. There are actually good 
reasons to separately model the counts for public specialists in face of those for private 
specialists. In our case study we notice that private consultation is typically of higher accuracy, 
implies lower waiting times at the cost of higher out-of-pocket payment comparing to public 
ones. Therefore aggregating the two counts would lead to misleading interpretation of the 
estimated elasticities. On the supply side it is pretty relevant to realise that the role of physician 
incentives affect utilisation. Indirect evidence of this is provided by Table 1. In countries where 
general practitioners (GPs) are paid fee-for-service, per-capita consultations are slightly more 
than in countries where they are paid according to capitation, but are almost double than in 
countries where GPs are salaried. This provides a strong, additional rationale for our analysis of 
health service utilisation in which we will emphasise the role played by different types of 
provider. 
Table 1: Per-capita general practitioners' consultations across some European 
countries 
 1990-1997 Subgroup mean 
 Fee-for-service 
Belgium 7.9  
France 6.2  
Germany 6.0 6.7 
 Capitation 
Italy 6.7  
Netherlands 5.7  
United Kingdom 5.8 6.1 
 Salary 
Finland 4.0  
Iceland 4.9  
Norway 3.8  
Portugal 3.2  
Sweden 2.9 3.8 
Source: Our elaboration on OECD Health Data 1999, OECD, Paris, 1999 
Jimenez-Martin - Labeaga - Martinez-Granado (2002), using data from the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP), estimate a model of demand for physician services for 
several European countries, Italy included. However they do not distinguish between public and 
private providers. We will refer to their results while commenting on ours. On the equity issue 
Van Doorslaer - Koolman - Puffer (2002), working on an EU sample coming from the ECHP 
and again disregarding the private vs. public issue, suggest that "the rich appear to receive a 
higher share of specialist visits than expected on the basis of their need". This result holds for 
Italy as well. In our viewpoint it is interesting to understand how does this result emerge in 
terms of access to different types of specialists. 
We use the new Italian Survey on Health Ageing and Wealth (SHAW), conducted in the 
year 2001, to analyse physician services utilisation explicitly acknowledging the existence of 
two different classes of providers: public and private. We focus on visits by a specialist 
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physician. Actually it is reasonable to presume that the dynamics we described above largely 
involve this segment and less so GPs visits. In the year before the survey (year 2000), 
individuals can consume this service going public, private or both. Our aim is to evaluate the 
determinants of individual utilisation for both classes of providers. In particular we wish to 
assess the relative importance of variables like income, education, private insurance and supply 
characteristics as determinants of the utilisation of such services, while controlling for individual 
health and need. 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we qualitatively review the existing 
econometric literature on health-care services utilisation. Section 3 describes the data and some 
institutional details of our case study. The major empirical results are reported in section 4. 
Section 5 concludes the paper with suggestions for future research.  
2 MODELS FOR HEALTH SERVICE UTILIZATION  
It has become generally accepted in the literature on the demand for health care that the 
demand for certain types of these services depends on two different decision processes. In the 
Grossman tradition, as far as the demand for health care is essentially seen as the result of 
patients intertemporal utility maximisation, utilisation is primarily patient determined, though 
conditioned by the health-care delivery system. In the agency approach, physicians play an 
active role in assessing the amount of services that patients should consume, up to the point of 
distorting demand according to their own preferences. These two perspectives lead to two 
different streams of econometric modelling traditions: one-step models in the Grossman 
tradition [see Duan et al. (1983) and Cameron et al. (1988)] and two-step models in the agency 
tradition [see Manning et al. (1981) and Pohlmeier - Ulrich (1995)]. In this paper we model 
counts of specialist visits by relying on both traditions.  
The Grossman model and the agency perspective on patient-physician relationship provide 
different, despite complementary explanations for the demand for health care. We look at them 
in sequence. 
2.1 THE GROSSMAN MODEL 
The Grossman model [see Grossman (1982)] emphasises the role played by patients' choice 
looking at health and wealth as two interrelated assets the values of which are optimally 
controlled over time by the individual. In the case of health, the marginal utility of holding a 
marginal unit of stock has a consumption and an investment component, which together must 
always be equal to its marginal user cost. This consists of the interest rate, health capital 
depreciation and a possible change in the value of the health capital over time. 
In this context the demand for health care services is a derived demand, in that services are 
not consumed per se but serve to maintain or improve upon a certain health status. The typical 
form of the individual demand function for health care services that emerges from the Grossman 
model is given by:  
)](),(),(),(),(),([)( tXtEtagetptwtHftM m=   
The demand for health care services (for simplicity we call them medical services) at time t, 
M(t), is endogenously codetermined2 with the latent variable "health status", H(t), and it is 
affected by the wage rate, w(t), a price vector for medical services, pm(t), individual age, age(t), 
                                                 
2 The Grossman model is deterministic, so that desidered health stock always equal actual health 
stock, given constraints. Therefore the demand for health services, which adjust existing health stock net 
of depreciation, is positively linked, one-to-one, with endogenous health stock. 
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the level of education, E(t), and a vector of environmental effects, X(t).  
A higher wage lowers the marginal incentive to hold health as an asset for consumption 
use, thus depressing the demand for medical care. By way of contrast it increases the 
opportunity cost of sick time, hence reinforcing the incentive to hold health as an asset. 
Assessing the impact of wage on medical service demand is therefore an empirical matter. The 
impact of prices is negative like that of better education. This last one should lower the demand 
for investment in health because it contributes to lower health stock depreciation3. Demand for 
medical care should increase with ageing, because it is not optimal to let health stock decline in 
step with depreciation.  
2.2 THE AGENCY APPROACH 
In the agency approach, physicians play an active role in assessing the amount of services 
that patients should consume as far as they typically act a double role: performing checks on the 
status of patient's health stock and, conditional on checks, supplying treatments aimed at 
restoring health stock to a desired level. Significant information asymmetry may provide 
physicians the opportunity to influence demand through their role as health evaluators. This 
informational advantage is exploited provided that physician's objective function differs from 
patient's. In this respect it is common to assume that physicians do not only follow Hippocratic 
oath (for example maximising individual health), but derive utility also from income and leisure. 
Therefore, when income or leisure are tailored to specific procedures and/or services, physicians 
will distort demand to perform more remunerative, or less time consuming, procedures/services, 
if the marginal benefits of a specific procedure outweighs the associated marginal costs.  
In this framework a large body of empirical research is devoted to test the so called supplier 
induced demand (SID) hypothesis. The SID hypothesis states that [McGuire - Pauly (1991)] in 
the face of negative income shocks, physicians may exploit their agency relationship with 
patients by providing excessive care. Income shocks examined in the literature arise from three 
different sources. A first source is variation in the physician/population density across areas: 
increased density lowers the income of existing stock of physicians, and it will lead to increased 
utilisation of medical procedures in an inducement-type model. Income shocks may also emerge 
as the consequence of an exogenous change in demand due to epidemiological shifts, evolution 
of needs, variation in tastes. However, the most common source is variation in fees paid to 
physicians, generally by government payers. The inducement model has traditionally been tested 
by assessing how these three alternative changes in the environment facing physicians affect the 
utilisation of medical procedures4. Despite each of these testing strategies face important 
problems they are quite convergent in suggesting that physicians, to some extent, do actually 
manage demand according to economic incentives.  
2.3 THE BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR MODELS OF VISITS' COUNTS 
2.3.1 Econometric models for count data 
The class of econometric models of health service demand we consider here is that 
concerned with discrete counts of medical visits. In this case excess zeroes is the most relevant 
                                                 
3 In a more general model, Ehrlich - Chuma (1990) show that the impact of education may go in 
both directions. 
4 Representative studies that use physician density changes to proxy for income shocks are Fuchs 
(1978) and Cromwell - Mitchell (1986). Gruber - Owings (1996) use exogenous demand changes, while 
Yip (1998) examines fee changes. 
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modelling issue5. From a purely statistical viewpoint, the problem basically consists in building 
enough flexibility into the econometric model to account for the excess probability mass 
concentrated in the zero counts. Tackling this problem has major econometric and economic 
implications. In general terms the problem of built-in-flexibility can be addressed in either a 
single process perspective (determining both null and positive counts), or in a double process 
perspective (one generating the zeroes vs. the positives and one determining the positives 
provided that a positive has been already generated). In the context of our study, this amounts to 
say that in a single process approach all the visits counts, zeroes included, are driven by the 
same process. On the other hand, when a double process is envisaged, contact process (to access 
to medical treatment or not?) is distinguished from utilisation (given that the first answer is 
YES, how much to consume?). From an economic viewpoint, the double process perspective 
has a natural appeal in the health economics literature as far as it distinguishes the two-part 
character of the decision-making process in health care demand [Stoddart - Barer (1981)]. While 
at the first stage it is the patient who decides whether or not she needs medical attention and 
therefore to access a physician (contact analysis), in the second stage the health care providers 
together with the patient determine the intensity of the treatment (frequency analysis). This 
modelling approach has, given certain conditions, a sound structural interpretation [see Santos 
Silva - Windmeijer (2001)] which motivated its broad adoption in empirical studies. Moreover it 
provides a unifying empirical framework for the two above-mentioned theories of health care 
demand. A Grossman-like interpretation might be called for explaining the contact decision, 
while an agency perspective could be invoked for the interpretation of the frequency decision.  
In the single process approach, the simplest econometric model for count data is based on 
the Poisson distribution, which is characterised by the property of equidispersion. This imply 
that, conditionally to the covariates introduced in the model, the mean of the count variable is 
equal to its variance and makes the Poisson model unsuitable in most empirical application, 
where the above-mentioned excess zeroes displayed by the count variable makes the conditional 
variance to exceed the conditional mean. The most popular parametric model accounting for 
overdispersion is based on the Negative Binomial distribution, which can be seen as a 
generalisation of a Poisson process. The alternative way of dealing with the excess zeros lies in 
the second modelling approach, represented by the hurdle model. This modification of the basic 
model was firstly introduced by Mullahy (1986) and thereafter received a great deal of attention 
in the empirical analysis of the usage of medical services. The hurdle model can be interpreted 
as a two part model, in which a binary model for the decision of use, determining the probability 
of crossing a zero threshold, is combined with a truncated count data model on positive counts, 
explaining  the extent of use conditionally to some use.6  
We present in the Appendix the econometric details of the Negative Binomial (NB) and the 
Double Hurdle (H) model we use later in the paper for our empirical application, where the 
demand for physician services is measured by counts of utilisation, i.e. number of public and 
private visits consumed by the individuals in our sample. 
                                                 
5 Similar methodological problems arise while considering continuous demand measures like 
expenditure [see Newhouse and The Insurance Experiment Study Group (1993)]. 
6 For the sake of completeness it has to be noticed that, on a purely statistical ground, there is no 
clear evidence that econometric models based on the two process approach should be preferred to those 
relying on a single process approach. Actually it has been shown [Deb - Trivedi (1997, 2002)] that 
sufficiently flexible specification, based on latent class analysis, let single process models better fit the 
empirical distribution of visits' counts. 
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2.3.2 Overview of empirical evidence on the determinants of specialist visits 
A common feature in the literature on models for visit counts is the lack of control for 
medical services' prices. This is due to unavailability of detailed data on single visits outlays. As 
far as surveys are designed to gather total number of visits per time period, no data are available 
on each visit payment7. Therefore, monetary opportunity costs are typically captured by private 
insurance status variables [like in Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) and Deb - Trivedi (1997)] or, 
more precisely, by individual coinsurance rates [like in Deb - Trivedi (2002)].8 Usually the 
availability of private insurance is found to positively affect contact choice but not frequency 
choice [Pohlmeier - Ulrich (1995)]. Similar effects are found for co-payment rates: higher co-
payment rates result in a lower probability of contact while frequency is unaffected [Deb - 
Trivedi (2002)]. These results are coherent with a Grossman interpretation but less so with an 
agency perspective.  
Coming to the results concerning other typical regressors in models for visits' counts it must 
be noticed that some predictions of the Grossman model are frequently contradicted by 
empirical evidence9. In particular, good health status is found to be negatively related to the 
number of visits. This results is coherently consistent across all the papers we reviewed despite 
differences in econometric specification. Education, typically measured as years of schooling, is 
usually found to increase visits counts [see Deb - Trivedi (1997, 2002)]. Pohlmeier - Ulrich 
(1995) show that higher education reduces contact decision for GPs visits while increases it for 
specialists, in both cases not affecting frequency. Santos Silva - Windmeijer (2001) find that 
education positively affects contacts and negatively affects frequency for specialist visits. 
Evidence concerning the impact of income and age tends to be more coherent with the theory.  
The theoretical partition between the two processes in the two-part approach underpins the 
choice and interpretation of typical regressors’ coefficients introduced in each of the two-part 
components. Take for instance the paper by Pohlmeier - Ulrich (1995). They estimate two 
distinct two-part models for general practitioners visits and for specialist visits on a sample of 
5.000 employed Germans. They control for sex, income, age, education, chronic conditions, 
physician density in place of residence, plus a set of other covariates. It is interesting here to 
notice the results on physician density. The two-part model estimates show that physician 
density does not affect the contact choice while it has a positive impact on the frequency 
decision. The authors note that "while physician density proxies an availability effect for the 
patient at the first stage, it captures both demand and supplier response at the second stage. …  
we are inclined to interpret this finding as some evidence of supplier-induced demand". 
Likewise also other common covariates to the two parts are given different interpretation in the 
contact and frequency analysis. 
3 DATA AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
Our data source is the new Survey on Health Ageing and Wealth (SHAW) collected in 
2001. The data are described in Brugiavini, Jappelli and Weber (2002) and are downloadable at 
the following address: http://www.dise.unisa.it/WP/shaw_public_file.dta. The survey focuses on 
individuals aged 50 or more. The dataset includes a wide range of micro-level information on 
socio-economic characteristics of individuals and households, including specific variables on 
                                                 
7 Pohlmeier - Ulrich (1995) argue that the impact of prices may be neglected given that for many 
western health care systems the direct price of medical services is close to zero. 
8 Introducing insurance status variables raises endogeneity problems. See Cameron et al. (1988), 
Windemeijer - Santos Silva (1997), Vera Hernandez (1999). 
9 Wagstaff concludes that "the majority of the model's structural parameters are in fact of the 'wrong 
sign'" [Wagstaff (1986), p. 216]. 
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working and living conditions as well as variables on health condition and health care 
utilisation. We include in our sample householders and their spouse when the latter is aged 50 or 
more. Accordingly, the total sample consists of 1664 individuals. 
 We model as a dependent variable the number of visits to a specialist physician. These 
include opticians, dentists and any other physician specialised in a certain field. In performing 
our analysis of visit counts separately for public and private specialists we dropped observations 
displaying missing values or unrealistic counts (greater than 20) for the dependent variables. As 
a result, we work on a sample of 1598 individuals for the analysis of private specialist visits and 
a sample of 1608 observations for public specialist visits. Table 2 shows the tabulations for the 
two counts in our dependent variables. Zero counts are about 60% for private specialist 
consultations, and about 3 point percent higher in the distribution of public ones. Alternative, 
private visits’ participation rates is around 40%, while the corresponding figure for public visits 
is 37%. 647 and 597 individuals are observed with at least one visit to a public and a private 
specialist respectively. Private consultations are more frequent on our sample due to larger 
incidence of higher counts - 3.7 vs. 2.9 on positive counts -. Contact decision process leads to 
similar sample means participation rates across providers' types, while the second stage process 
differentiates conditional frequencies of visits across types. This provides a first evidence that 
the process underlying the contact decision is different from the second stage process. 
Table 2: Tabulations of specialist visits in our sample 
  PUBLIC  PRIVATE 
 Count Freq. Percent Cum.  Freq. Percent Cum. 
 0 1011 62.87 62.87  951 59.51 59.51 
 1 213 13.25 76.12  180 11.26 70.78 
 2 147 9.14 85.26  138 8.64 79.41 
 3 81 5.04 90.3  99 6.2 85.61 
 4 50 3.11 93.41  60 3.75 89.36 
 5 31 1.93 95.34  51 3.19 92.55 
 6 28 1.74 97.08  28 1.75 94.31 
 7 10 0.62 97.7  20 1.25 95.56 
 8 6 0.37 98.07  17 1.06 96.62 
 9 2 0.12 98.2  2 0.13 96.75 
 10 11 0.68 98.88  18 1.13 97.87 
 +10 18 1.12 100  34 2.14 100 
Total  1608 100 100  1598 100 100 
Positives  597    647   
  Mean Variance St. dev.  Mean Variance St. dev. 
Full Sample  1.088 4.554 2.134  1.501 8.318 2.884 
Positive counts  2.930 6.869 2.621  3.708 12.361 3.516 
Participation rate  0.371 0.147 0.383  0.405 0.143 0.379 
 
A first indication of overdispersion in the data is obtained when the sample variance of the 
dependent count variable is found to be greater than its sample mean. After inclusion of 
regressors, the Poisson model sample conditional variance will decrease with respect to the 
sample variance, while the sample average of the conditional mean will be equal to the sample 
mean if a constant is included among the regressors. Cameron and Trivedi point out that if the 
sample variance is more than twice the sample mean - this is true in our data for both public and 
private visits - the data are likely to exhibit overdispersion even after inclusion of regressors, as 
in cross-section data regressions usually explain less than half of the variation of the dependent 
variable. 
Explanatory variables are conventional predisposing variables and variables capturing the 
access to medical services. Table 3 contains a description of the variables used in this piece of 
empirical work (see Table A1 in Appendix 1 for some descriptive statistics of these variables). 
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We tried to keep our specification as parsimonious as possible, while mimicking similar 
specification in the literature. In this respect our specification is very close to Deb - Trivedi 
(1997) and quite similar to Pohlmeier - Ulrich (1995) thus allowing us to make useful 
comparisons.  
It should be noticed that public specialists are paid according to administered prices, while 
private ones are free to set prices according to competitive pressures coming from close 
substitutes. This feature would suggest that controlling for out-of-pocket payments would be 
quite relevant in our case study. SHAW collects information on total amount paid out-of-pocket 
for the cumulative count of visits, both specialist and generic, in each type of provider. However 
no-response rate was quite large (23% for public and 17% for private visits). Moreover 
averaging outlays across multiple visits could severely distort results. We preferred, at this 
stage, not to use payments information in the modelling exercise. 
Table 3: Description of variables 
Variable Description 
Dependent   
Public specialist visits Number of visits to a public specialist in the year before survey (2000) 
Private specialist visits Number of visits to a private specialist in the year before survey (2000) 
Explanatory   
Family income Monthly family income, net of income taxes and social insurance rates 
Education Number of year of education 
Unemployed =1 if the person is unemployed 
Female =1 if the person is female 
Single =1 if the person is unmarried or widow 
Age Age in years 
Chronic conditions =1 if the person suffers from chronic conditions 
Physical limitations =1 if the person has a condition that limits activities of daily life 
Poor self-perceived health =1 if self-perceived health is poor 
Excellent self-perceived health =1 if self-perceived health is excellent 
Hearing troubles =1 if the person suffers from hearing troubles 
Eyesight troubles =1 if the person suffers from eye troubles 
Never smoked =1 if the person never smoked in his life 
Alcohol consumption =1 if the person consumes alcohol regularly  
Private health insurance =1 if the person is covered by private health insurance 
Central region =1 if the person lives in central regions 
Southern region =1 if the person lives in southern regions  
Public exp. per-capita Public expenditure per capita in the residing Local Health Authority 
Availability of private hospitals =1 if private hospitals are present in the residing Local Health Authority area 
Physicians per bed in private Ratio of physician per bed in private hospitals operating in the residing Local Health Authority area 
Physicians per bed in public Ratio of physician per bed in public hospitals operating in the residing Local Health Authority area 
Physician density Authorised physician per 1000 inhabitants in place of residence 
Population Total population in place of residence (in thousands of inhabitants) 
4 RESULTS 
4.1 THE NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATES 
We start our empirical analysis by estimating NB models on the number of public and 
private specialist consultations respectively. The Maximum Likelihood estimation results10 
reported in Table 4 reveal that the Poisson distribution is indeed rejected by the data, as the 
“nesting” parameter f is found to be significantly different from zero. This confirms the 
stylised facts on overdispersion of the data emerged by the descriptive analysis.  
                                                 
10 The estimation has been obtained using STATA 7. 
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The main findings concerning the role of the inserted explanatory variables are the 
following. Family income appears to be an important determinant of the number of private 
consultations, with higher income families increasing their utilisation of private services. On the 
contrary, the demand of public specialist visits is not affected by the family income variable.  
The level of schooling has a significant positive impact on both private and public counts. 
This education effect result agrees with the conventional reason that education makes 
individuals more informed consumers and signals that more educated people are oriented 
towards a more frequent use of medical care services.  
Table 4: Estimates of the negative binomial model 
 PUBLIC  PRIVATE 
 Coef. Std. Err. z   Coef. Std. Err. z  
Family income -0.0123 0.0499 -0.2500   0.1282 0.0427 3.0000 *** 
Family income_sq 0.0028 0.0021 1.3000   -0.0054 0.0019 -2.8700 *** 
Education 0.1087 0.0361 3.0100 ***  0.0851 0.0361 2.3600 ** 
Education_sq -0.0058 0.0020 -2.8600 ***  -0.0016 0.0018 -0.9100  
Unemployed 0.2178 0.1369 1.5900   -0.0756 0.1254 -0.6000  
Female 0.1778 0.1074 1.6600 *  0.3897 0.1073 3.6300 *** 
Single -0.0270 0.1328 -0.2000   0.0675 0.1229 0.5500  
Age -0.0984 0.0695 -1.4200   0.0707 0.0722 0.9800  
Age_sq 0.0007 0.0005 1.4300   -0.0006 0.0006 -1.0400  
Chronic conditions 0.5299 0.1097 4.8300 ***  0.3312 0.1223 2.7100 *** 
Physical limitations 0.4695 0.1315 3.5700 ***  -0.1615 0.1443 -1.1200  
Poor self-perceived health 0.1596 0.1472 1.0800   0.3649 0.1693 2.1500 ** 
Excellent self-perceived health -0.5103 0.1163 -4.3900 ***  -0.0368 0.1255 -0.2900  
Hearing troubles 0.2435 0.1677 1.4500   0.1115 0.2058 0.5400  
Eyesight troubles 0.2600 0.1419 1.8300   0.3506 0.1540 2.2800 ** 
Never smoked -0.2273 0.1069 -2.1300 **  -0.3823 0.1038 -3.6800 *** 
Alcohol consumption 0.5514 0.4578 1.2000   -0.9225 0.4584 -2.0100 ** 
Private health insurance -0.0258 0.2320 -0.1100   0.5300 0.1954 2.7100 *** 
Central region -0.4911 0.1505 -3.2600 ***  0.0248 0.1507 0.1600  
Southern region -0.2974 0.1146 -2.5900 ***  0.0356 0.1179 0.3000  
Public expenditure per-capita 0.1411 0.1136 1.2400   -0.0184 0.1202 -0.1500  
Availability of private hospitals 0.5966 0.1877 3.1800 ***  -0.1051 0.1891 -0.5600  
Physicians per bed in private -1.8275 0.5158 -3.5400 ***  0.3111 0.5418 0.5700  
Physicians per bed in public -0.7078 0.6174 -1.1500   -1.1649 0.5726 -2.0300 ** 
Physician density 0.1873 0.0386 4.8500 ***  0.0526 0.0415 1.2700  
Population/100 0.0444 0.0314 1.4200   -0.0185 0.0292 -0.6300  
Population/100_sq -1.9050 1.2610 -1.5100   -0.1420 1.1800 -0.1200  
Constant 1.5368 2.3347 0.6600   -2.5140 2.3555 -1.0700  
Ln(alpha) 0.7402 0.0792    1.0697 0.0623   
Alpha 2.0965 0.1660    2.9145 0.1815   
          
Number of obs. 1608     1598    
Wald chi2(27) 310.54     157.02    
Prob > chi2 0.000     0.000    
Pseudo R2 0.0556     0.0221    
Log likelihood -2061.76     -2426.88    
 
Holding a private health insurance increases the consultations of private specialists. This is 
a common result in the applied literature which is coherent with fours stories. The first one 
relates to price elasticities (being double insured allows to access private health care at lower 
out-of-pocket payments). According to the second explanation, this could also be the effect of 
an adverse selection process making the frequent health services users to look for supplementary 
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coverage and cost reimbursement.11 A third key of interpretation is represented by moral hazard 
where incentives by the patient and the physicians for over-treatment align against the insurer. 
The last possible explanation has to do with supplier induced demand in a wide sense. 
Pohlmeier - Ulrich (1995) find no evidence of such behaviour as the private insurance dummy is 
only significant in the firs stage - i.e. contact decision - of their hurdle model.  
Turning to the demographic variables, we find that individual’s age play no role in both 
equations. The effect of this variable is usually found to be negative until some age (which 
varies from 33 to 52 in different studies), and increasing thereafter. We observe coherent 
coefficient signs in the public visit equation, but these parameters are not enough precisely 
estimated.12 Women appear to seek more medical care than men, as usually evidenced in 
empirical studies. In our context, this is true both for private and public specialist consultations.   
The health status measures display the usual empirical link with the degree of utilisation of 
medical care. This increases when chronic conditions or physical limitations are present, the 
level of self-perceived health is poor and in presence of eyesight troubles (private visits), and 
decreases with excellent self-assessed health (public visits). Individuals who never smoked seek 
less both public and private medical consultations. Customary consumers of super-alcoholic 
drinks use less private doctor visits. 
Regional-specific unobservable factors make public specialists less accessible in central 
and southern Italy than in northern Italy. This evidence has been already noticed by Van 
Doorslaer - Koolman - Puffer (2002) for the aggregate utilisation of specialist visits. We show 
however that it does not hold for the private providers. We could infer that this effect has to do 
with local government "failures", being private consultation purchased on competitive local 
markets. The effect of the size of the community of residence, aimed at proxying the opportunity 
costs of visiting a physician, turns out not to be significant. The variables which proxy the 
accessibility to the two kind of medical services show the expected sign, with the ratio of 
physicians per bed in private (public) hospitals exhibiting a negative effect on the number of 
visits demanded from public (private) physicians. Finally a higher  physician density increases 
the number of public specialists consultations. 
4.2 THE HURDLE MODEL ESTIMATES 
The Maximum Likelihood estimation results of the two parts of the model (probit at the 
first stage, truncated negative binomial at the second one) are contained in Tables 5 and 613. 
A first look at both tables reveals that the first stage model exhibits a better fit than the 
second one. Some of the variables which were non significant in the NB specification turned out 
as being important determinants of the contact decision. It may be tempting to interpret this 
finding as an evidence in favour of the Grossman model for the explanation of the contact 
decision. However, as Pohlmeier - Ulrich (1995) point out, household data are better suited to 
quantify the determinants of the contact decision, while the frequency of use also depends on 
supply-side factors on which observable information is limited. Also, the number of 
observations is considerably reduced in the second part of the model. Despite this, there is a 
number of relevant comments concerning differences between the parameters across the two 
stages and with the NB model, which does not distinguish between the two parts. 
                                                 
11 Following this interpretation, a problem of endogeneity of the private insurance variable can be 
envisaged. 
12 This result might be due to the substitution of hospital admissions for specialists' visits. We are 
grateful to Tullio Jappelli for suggesting this interpretation of the age coefficient.  
13 In order to implement estimation with the truncated negative binomial distribution we resorted to 
the STATA ado file provided by Hilbe (1999) on the Stata Technical Bulletin.  
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The regressors mostly exert on the modelled probability of contacting a public/private 
specialist a similar effect to what was found in the NB model. To higher family income 
corresponds higher probability of contacting a private specialist. The income variable is now 
significant also in determining a less probable contact with a public specialist. This result marks 
a clear distance between our analysis and that conducted by Jimenez-Martin - Labeaga - 
Martinez-Granado (2002). According to them the contact decision for specialist visits in Italy is 
positively, despite decreasingly, affected by income.14 We show that this holds for private 
specialists only. We report no significant impact of income on the frequency decision. 
Consistently with our previous findings, more educated individual tend to have higher 
probability of contacting a public physician. It has to be noticed that this set of variables turns 
out not to be relevant in the second stage model. Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) find the same 
result on both the counts of general practitioner and specialist visits. This means that once the 
kind of provider is chosen, income and education do not affect the frequency behaviour.  
Table 5: Estimates of the double hurdle model: first stage 
 PUBLIC  PRIVATE 
 Coef. Std. Err. z   Coef. Std. Err. z  
Family income -0.0470 0.0203 -2.3100 **  0.0694 0.0233 2.9800 *** 
Family income_sq 0.0039 0.0013 2.9900 ***  -0.0024 0.0013 -1.8800 * 
Education 0.0407 0.0132 3.0700 ***  0.0131 0.0147 0.8900  
Education_sq -0.0021 0.0006 -3.2700 ***  0.0004 0.0008 0.4900  
Unemployed 0.0860 0.0464 1.8500 *  -0.0643 0.0617 -1.0400  
Female 0.0546 0.0407 1.3400   0.1564 0.0474 3.3000 *** 
Single -0.0403 0.0511 -0.7900   0.0543 0.0572 0.9500  
Age -0.0565 0.0295 -1.9200 *  0.0247 0.0293 0.8400  
Age_sq 0.0005 0.0002 1.9900 **  -0.0002 0.0002 -0.9200  
Chronic conditions 0.2242 0.0579 3.8700 ***  0.1517 0.0556 2.7300 *** 
Physical limitations 0.2343 0.0871 2.6900 ***  -0.0049 0.0733 -0.0700  
Poor self-perceived health 0.0220 0.0987 0.2200   0.0553 0.0867 0.6400  
Excellent self-perceived health -0.1796 0.0530 -3.3900 ***  -0.0287 0.0523 -0.5500  
Hearing troubles 0.0157 0.1040 0.1500   0.1131 0.0958 1.1800  
Eyesight troubles 0.0713 0.0777 0.9200   0.1698 0.0826 2.0600 ** 
Never smoked -0.0702 0.0396 -1.7800 *  -0.1160 0.0472 -2.4600 ** 
Alcohol consumption -0.0484 0.1434 -0.3400   -0.2508 0.1402 -1.7900 * 
Private health insurance -0.0833 0.0728 -1.1400   0.1759 0.1234 1.4300  
Central region -0.1852 0.0538 -3.4400 ***  -0.0542 0.0629 -0.8600  
Southern region -0.1519 0.0490 -3.1000 ***  -0.0422 0.0542 -0.7800  
Public expenditure per-capita 0.1323 0.0569 2.3200 **  -0.0530 0.0574 -0.9200  
Availability of private hospitals 0.3367 0.0778 4.3300 ***  -0.0817 0.0818 -1.0000  
Physicians per bed in private -0.9976 0.2178 -4.5800 ***  0.1428 0.2407 0.5900  
Physicians per bed in public -0.4148 0.2307 -1.8000 *  0.0442 0.2626 0.1700  
Physician density 0.0747 0.0194 3.8500 ***  0.0301 0.0194 1.5500  
Population/100 0.0310 0.0136 2.2900 **  -0.0060 0.0145 -0.4200  
Population/100_sq -1.3310 0.5220 -2.5500 **  -0.2880 0.5510 -0.5200  
Constant 1.6293 0.9528 1.7100 *  -0.5659 0.9744 -0.5800  
          
Number of obs 1608     1598    
Wald chi2(27) 229.62     112.12    
Prob > chi2 0.000     0.000    
Pseudo R2 0.0305     0.015    
Log likelihood -1435.06     -1422.85    
                                                 
14 Within a different framework Van Doorslaer - Koolman - Puffer (2002) reach a similar 
conclusion. 
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Age has significant negative, despite decreasing, impact on the propensity to contact a 
public specialist. Age, however, does not seem to affect the frequency decision. This result was 
concealed in the NB model specification. Women do not show to contact and to visit more 
frequently public specialists. On the contrary the female dummy have a significant impact on 
both steps for private consultations. Health status variables tend to play a major role in the 
contact decision and for the public specialists. According to our evidence it seems that, once a 
patient choose a private specialist, the frequency of visits does not depend on his health.  
Differently from the NB model, the size of the community of residence positively affects 
the decision of contacting a public specialist: individuals living in a bigger town reveal to face a 
lower opportunity cost of contacting a public specialist. On the same line of reasoning, regional 
effects, which, according to the NB model, proved to be relevant for the public consultations, 
not for the private, show to be mainly relevant for the contact decision and less so for the 
frequency decision. These two results might reflect government inefficiencies, compared to the 
performance of competitive markets for private consultations, in providing equal access to 
specialist visits.  
Table 6: Estimates of the double hurdle model: second stage 
 PUBLIC  PRIVATE 
 Coef. Std. Err. z   Coef. Std. Err. z  
Family income 0.0742 0.0536 1.3800   0.0168 0.0480 0.3500  
Family income_sq -0.0036 0.0026 -1.3900   -0.0012 0.0023 -0.5300  
Education 0.0375 0.0425 0.8800   0.0499 0.0406 1.2300  
Education_sq -0.0017 0.0024 -0.7300   -0.0009 0.0020 -0.4600  
Unemployed -0.0250 0.1672 -0.1500   -0.0245 0.1337 -0.1800  
Female 0.0660 0.1294 0.5100   0.2286 0.1137 2.0100 ** 
Single -0.0445 0.1453 -0.3100   -0.0741 0.1362 -0.5400  
Age -0.0235 0.0788 -0.3000   0.0153 0.0821 0.1900  
Age_sq 0.0001 0.0006 0.2100   -0.0001 0.0006 -0.2300  
Chronic conditions 0.2675 0.1201 2.2300 **  0.0938 0.1236 0.7600  
Physical limitations 0.2945 0.1398 2.1100 **  -0.1508 0.1565 -0.9600  
Poor self-perceived health 0.2770 0.1539 1.8000 *  0.2568 0.1772 1.4500  
Excellent self-perceived health -0.2815 0.1366 -2.0600 **  0.0285 0.1268 0.2200  
Hearing troubles 0.3027 0.1914 1.5800   -0.0212 0.2114 -0.1000  
Eyesight troubles 0.2555 0.1479 1.7300 *  0.1946 0.1589 1.2200  
Never smoked -0.0807 0.1223 -0.6600   -0.2694 0.1109 -2.4300 ** 
Alcohol consumption 0.8001 0.4373 1.8300 *  -0.4247 0.5754 -0.7400  
Private health insurance 0.2474 0.2630 0.9400   0.4172 0.1989 2.1000 ** 
Central region -0.3341 0.1653 -2.0200 **  0.1029 0.1492 0.6900  
Southern region -0.0157 0.1297 -0.1200   0.1288 0.1292 1.0000  
Public expenditure per-capita -0.0796 0.1284 -0.6200   -0.0063 0.1387 -0.0500  
Availability of private hospitals 0.3633 0.1964 1.8500 *  -0.0157 0.1943 -0.0800  
Physicians per bed in private -0.7005 0.5892 -1.1900   0.2921 0.5824 0.5000  
Physicians per bed in public -0.4842 0.6547 -0.7400   -2.1332 0.6224 -3.4300 *** 
Physician density 0.1056 0.0414 2.5500 **  0.0394 0.0432 0.9100  
Population/100 0.0029 0.0329 0.0900   -0.0042 0.0342 -0.1200  
Population/100_sq -0.0818 1.3280 -0.0600   0.5180 1.3700 0.3800  
Constant 0.7328 2.6225 0.2800   0.6960 2.6495 0.2600  
          
Constant -0.1894 0.2006 -0.9400   0.0281 0.1652 0.1700  
Alpha 0.8275     1.0285    
LR test against Poisson, chi2(1) 349.647     586.659    
          
Number of obs 597     647    
Model chi2(27) 89.03     56.04    
Prob > chi2 0.000     0.0009    
Pseudo R2 0.0397     0.0201    
Log Likelihood -1075.4595     -1368.0918    
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It is interesting to remark the impact of holding a private health insurance. This has no 
importance in the contact of either kind of specialists, but positively affects the frequency of 
private specialist visits. Following a line of reasoning suggested by Pohlmeier - Ulrich (1995) 
this last evidence is plausibly due to a supplier induced demand effect since only the frequency 
equation describes the outcome of the joint decisions of the physician and the patient, while the 
contact equation reflect patients' decisions only.  
Coming to the supply-side variables, their coefficients display different significance and 
magnitude in the two stages, as the hurdle model allows to disentangle their effect on the contact 
decision and the number of visits respectively. Public per-capita expenditure affects positively 
the decision to contact a public specialist, but not the number of referrals. The second measure 
of accessibility, represented by the number of doctors per bed in public hospitals is significant in 
the second part of the model and negatively related to the number of visits provided by private 
specialists. A higher physician density increases both the contact and frequency of use of public 
specialists.  
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Since 1992 larger shares of expenditure for physician services in Italy are financed out-of-
pocket. This is a result of two reinforcing dynamics: first, access to public providers are 
increasingly subject to significant co-payments (tickets); second, individuals increasingly rely 
on private professionals. These evolving patterns motivate our interest for a microeconometric 
analysis of the demand for physician services in Italy.  
Existing econometric models perform aggregate demand analysis, i.e. model the overall 
counts of physician visits or specialist visits consumed by individuals as explained by covariates 
like income, out-of-pocket payments, coinsurance rates, health conditions. In case patients, 
within an health-care delivery system like the Italian, could receive the same service by two 
different classes of providers, say public vs. private, major problems of interpretation arise in 
performing aggregate demand estimation.  
We used the new Italian Survey on Health Ageing and Wealth (SHAW) to analyse 
physician services utilisation explicitly acknowledging the existence of two different classes of 
providers: public and private. We considered visits by a specialist physician as the measure of 
individual services utilisation. Our aim was to evaluate the determinants of individual utilisation 
for both classes of providers. The econometric evidence we found confirmed that the private and 
public counts are driven by different processes. Therefore, examining the two services 
separately allowed us to make some inference and to gain some hints on the specific 
determinants for each class of providers.  
Generally speaking, our analysis confirmed that the kind of observational data on visits 
counts typically used in the literature are better suited to quantify the determinants of the contact 
decision, while the frequency of use also depends on supply-side factors on which observable 
information is limited. It is rash to say that this evidence is in favour of a Grossman-like 
explanation of the demand for health care services. Actually, it is hard to believe that physicians 
play no role in determining visits counts. However, in the health economics literature, it is 
common to notice that individual conditions generally play a major role in explaining 
behavioural and medical outcome variation [see Silber - Rosenbaum - Ross (1995)]. 
According to our results age does not play any strong role in determining the utilisation of 
medical consultations. We only found a very small negative effect on the decision to contact a 
public physician. Putting this result on a policy perspective we might be tempted to observe that 
ageing does not seem to be a major problem for the public financing of such expenditures. 
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We also found that holding a private health insurance has no importance in determining the 
contact of either kind of specialists, but positively affects the frequency of private specialist 
visits. We interpreted this last evidence as due to a supplier induced demand effect. A deeper 
analysis of such an effect is needed than the one we conducted here. We believe that this will be 
a major issue in the next future, given the foreseeable reduction of public direct provision of 
specialist consultations and the enlargement of the doubly-insured segment of the population. A 
predictable effect is an increasing tendency towards the integration of insurance companies and 
medical providers aimed at reducing ex-post moral hazard behaviour of physicians.  
Coming to the equity of access issue our separate analysis for public and private specialists 
proved to be quite fruitful. Van Doorslaer - Koolman - Puffer (2002) show that looking at 
aggregate demand for medical services might conceal redistributing effects in the constituent 
components of this demand, namely GPs and specialists, as far as one may offset the other. In 
their context they show that, in Italy, GPs access is slightly pro-poor, while access to specialist 
is clearly pro-rich. Our analysis extends this results to the constituent part of the demand for 
specialist visits. Namely we find that being richer increases the propensity to contact a private 
specialist and consistently decreases the propensity to contact a public specialist. It is common 
to retain that private specialist are of higher quality. Therefore we conclude that in the Italian 
national health service access to better specialist consultation is pro-rich, with public provision 
mainly guaranteeing access to specialists consultation for the poorer. Moreover we found some 
indirect evidence of government failures to guarantee equal access opportunity to medical 
consultation across the country. Central and southern regions seem to suffer some rationing 
compared to the northern regions. We found no evidence of this differential effect for private 
consultation. Incidentally it must be noticed the doubly-insured segment of the population is 
mainly concentrated in the northern regions.  
From the analysis performed in this paper we received a strong indication of the importance 
of modelling the two counts, corresponding to private and public specialist visits, as driven by 
different processes. Next step in this direction consists in considering the two processes as 
jointly dependent, describing their interrelation in an analogous way as the seemingly unrelated 
regression model. The resulting bivariate framework is indeed the appropriate one to take into 
account and evaluate substitution/complementarity relationships which are likely to exists 
between the two classes of providers.  
 17
6 REFERENCES 
Brugiavini A. - Jappelli T. - Weber G. (2002), "The Survey of Health, Aging and Wealth", CSEF 
Working Paper n° 86, Università di Salerno.  
Cameron A.C. - Trivedi P.K. (1998), Regression Analysis of Count Data, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Cameron A.C. - Trivedi P.K. - Milne F. - Piggott J. (1988), "A microeconometric model of the demand 
for health care and health insurance in Australia", Review of Economic Studies, vol. 55, pp. 85-
106. 
Cromwell J. - Mitchell J. (1986), "Physician-induced demand for surgery", Journal of Health Economics, 
vol. 5, pp. 293-313. 
Cutler D.M. - Sheiner L. (1998), "Demographics and medical care spending: standard and non-standard 
effects", NBER Working Paper n° 6866. 
Deb P. - Trivedi P. (1997), "Demand for medical care by the elderly: a finite mixture approach", Journal 
of Applied Econometrics, vol. 12, pp. 313-336. 
Deb P. - Trivedi P. (2002), "The structure of demand for health care: latent class versus two-part 
models", Journal of Health Economics, vol. 21, pp. 601-625. 
Duan N. - Manning W.G. - Morris C.N. - Newhouse J.P. (1983), "A comparison of alternative models for 
the demand for medical care", Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, vol. 2, pp. 115-126.   
Fuchs V. (1978), "The supply of surgeons and the demand for operations", Journal of Human Resources, 
vol. 13, pp. 35-56. 
Grossman M. (1982), "The demand for health after a decade", Journal of Health Economics, vol. 1, pp. 
1-3.  
Gruber J. - Owings M. (1996), "Physician financial incentives and cesarean section", Rand Journal of 
Economics, vol. 27, 99-123.  
Ehrlich I. - Chuma H. (1990), "A model of the demand for longevity and the value of life extension", 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98, pp. 761-782. 
Hilbe J. (1999), "Zero-truncated Poisson and negative binomial regression", Stata Technical Bulletin, 
vol. 1/99, pp.37-40; Reprints Vol 8, pp.233-236. 
Jimenez-Martin S. - Labeaga J.M. - Martinez-Granado M. (2002), "Latent class versus two-part models 
in the demend for physician serveces across the European Union", Health Economics, vol. 11, pp. 
301-321. 
Manning et al. (1981), "A two-part model of the demand for medical care: preliminary study from the 
health insurance study", in Health, Economics, and Health Economics ed. by Sheffler R.M. - 
Rossiter, L.F., Amsterdam, North-Holland, pp. 103-123.  
McGuire T.G. - Pauly M.V. (1991), "Physician response to fee changes with multiple payers", Journal of 
Health Economics, vol. 10, pp. 385-410. 
Mullahy J. (1986), "Specification and testing of some modified count data models", Journal of 
Econometrics, vol. 33, pp. 341-365. 
Newhouse and The Insurance Experiment Study Group (1993), Free for All? Lessons from the RAND 
Health Insurance Expenditure, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.  
Pohlmeier W. - Ulrich V. (1995), "An econometric model of the two-part decisionmaking process in the 
demand for health care", Journal of Human Resources, vol. 30, pp. 339-61. 
Santos Silva J.M.C. - Windmeijer F. (2001), "Two-part multiple spell models for health care demand", 
Journal of Econometrics, vol. 104, pp. 67-89. 
 18
Silber J.H. - Rosenbaum P.R. - Ross R.N. (1995), "Comparing the contributions of groups of predictors: 
which outcomes vary with hospital rather than patients characteristics?", Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, vol. 90, pp. 7-18.  
Stoddart G.L. - Barer M.L. (1981), "Analyses of the demand and utilization through episodes of medical 
care", in Health, Economics and Health Economics, ed. by, van der Gaag J. -Perelman M., 
Amsterdam, North-Holland.  
Van Doorslaer E. - Koolman X . - Puffer F. (2002), "Equity in the use of physician visits in OECD 
countries: has equal treatment for equal need been achieved?", in Measuring Up: Improving health 
systems performance in OECD countries, OECD, Paris, France. 
Vera Hernandez A.M. (1999), "Duplicate coverage and demand for health care. the case of catalonia", 
Health Economics, vol. 8, pp. 579-98. 
Wagstaff A. (1986), "The demand for health - Some new empirical evidence", Journal of Health 
Economics, vol. 5, pp. 195-233. 
Windmeijer F. - Santos Silva J.M.C. (1997), "Endogeneity in count data models: an application to 
demand for health care", Journal of Applied Econometrics, vol. 12, pp. 281-94. 
Yip W.-C. (1998), "Physician response to medicare fee reductions: changes in the volume of Coronary 
Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) surgeries in the Medicare and private sectors", Journal of Health 
Economics, vol. 17, pp. 675-99.  
 19
APPENDIX 1 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics for the regressors 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Family income 3.260 2.426 0.300 25 
Family income_sq 16.511 41.272 0.09 625 
Education 7.662 4.578 0 21 
Education_sq 79.647 87.006 0 441 
Unemployed 0.753 0.431 0 1 
Female 0.533 0.499 0 1 
Single 0.195 0.397 0 1 
Age 63.108 9.010 50 92 
Age_sq 4063.768 1181.410 2500 8464 
Chronic conditions 0.338 0.473 0 1 
Physical limitations 0.186 0.389 0 1 
Poor self-perceived health 0.138 0.345 0 1 
Excellent self-perceived health 0.598 0.490 0 1 
Hearing troubles 0.057 0.232 0 1 
Eyesight troubles 0.111 0.314 0 1 
Never smoked 0.594 0.491 0 1 
Alcohol consumption 0.014 0.117 0 1 
Private health insurance 0.049 0.217 0 1 
Central region 0.209 0.407 0 1 
Southern region 0.362 0.481 0 1 
Public exp. per-capita 1.932 0.421 0.922 3.377 
Availability of private hospitals 0.826 0.379 0 1 
Physicians per bed in private 0.209 0.132 0 0.494 
Physicians per bed in public 0.429 0.102 0.182 0.649 
Physician density 5.624 1.377 3.513 8.782 
Population 240.978 592.576 0.337 2653.245 
Population_sq 409.005 1482.840 0.000 7039.709 
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APPENDIX 2: THE NEGATIVE BINOMIAL AND DOUBLE HURDLE MODELS 
Having available a sample of N independent observations ),( ii xy , where iy  denote the 
count variable of interest and ix a set of covariates, the starting point for count data analysis is 
the Poisson regression model, defined by the conditional density: 
!
);|(
i
y
i
ii
P
y
e
xyf
ii mb
m-
=  ,.....2,1,0=iy  (1) 
where: )exp( ' bm ii x= , 0>im . The property of equidispersion implied by the Poisson 
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To tackle with overdispersion we resort to the Negative Binomial (NB) distribution. This 
can be derived as a compound Poisson process where the parameter of the Poisson distribution 
includes a gamma distributed random variable reflecting individual heterogeneity: 
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distribution is obtained by integrating over in : 
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where )exp( ' bm ii x=  as above, and the conditional mean and variance are given by: 
iii xyE m=)|(  
2)|( iiii xyV fmm +=  
where 01 >= -af  is an overdispersion parameter, making the variance greater than the mean, as 
observed in many data sets. The parameters ),( ba  can be estimated by the maximizing 
numerically the log-likelihood function corresponding to the density above (estimation is 
automatically implemented in some statistical packages, like STATA). This is the most common 
implementation of the Negative Binomial Model, NB2 in the terminology of Cameron - Trivedi 
(1998). The additional parameter characterizing the NB distribution makes it more flexible than 
the Poisson, to which it reduces when  0=f . In most applications, NB regression models are 
likely to provide more efficient estimators than those based on Poisson distribution, as failure of 
the assumption of equidispersion has similar consequences to failure of the homoskedasticity 
assumption in the linear regression model [Cameron - Trivedi, 1998].  
                                                 
15The density function for the positive continuous variable in  is given by: 
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The alternative way of dealing with the “excess zeros” we follow in the paper is represented 
by the hurdle model. To illustrate the hurdle model, define a dummy variable describing the non 
use of a doctor in a given period: i.e. 1=id  if 0=iy . The probability function is then given by: 
[ ] )1(2111121 );0,|());|0(1();|0(),;|( ii diiitruncidiiiH yxyfxfxfxyf ->-= JJJJJ  (3) 
where: 
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The model specifies a binary probability determining whether the count has a zero 
realization. If the realization is positive, the hurdle is crossed and the conditional distribution is 
described by a truncated count model. The two processes can be driven by the same explanatory 
variables, but the interpretation of parameters will be different depending on the considered 
stage.  
The log-likelihood functions corresponding to (3) factors in two components, which can be 
separately maximized on the whole sample and on the positive observations respectively: 
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Estimation of the parameters requires some choice for the two density functions. In our 
application we use a probit model for the binary outcome, and a truncated negative binomial 
density for the intensity of use part of  the model. 
